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Generics (“Dogs bark”) convey important information about categories and facilitate children’s learning. Two
studies with parents and their 2- or 4-year-old children (N = 104 dyads) examined whether individual differ-
ences in generic language use are as follows: (a) stable over time, contexts, and domains, and (b) linked to
conceptual factors. For both children and parents, individual differences in rate of generic production were
stable across time, contexts, and domains, and parents’ generic usage signiﬁcantly correlated with that of their
own children. Furthermore, parents’ essentialist beliefs correlated with their own and their children’s rates of
generic frequency. These results indicate that generic language use exhibits substantial stability and may
reﬂect individual differences in speakers’ conceptual attitudes toward categories.
Language is a key mechanism for transmitting cul-
turally important knowledge across generations
(Gelman, 2009). For decades, scholars have noted
that speakers’ linguistic choices have consequences
for everyday thought. For example, expressing a
category with a noun versus an adjective or verbal
phrase emphasizes the coherence and stability of
the category (Cimpian, Arce, Markman, & Dweck,
2007; Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Walton & Banaji,
2004; Waxman & Leddon, 2011; Xu, 2007), express-
ing behaviors with more stable versus transient
forms of the verb “to be” affects trait concepts
(Heyman & Diesendruck, 2002), and verb choice
can inﬂuence causal attributions (Au, 1986; Brown
& Fish, 1983). Understanding when and how differ-
ent aspects of language are used and how they
relate to conceptual information can therefore
provide great insight into how children acquire the
knowledge systems of their culture.
One intriguing expression that has received
recent interest from psychologists, linguists, and
philosophers is that of generics (e.g., Dogs bark; A
dog is four legged; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Cim-
pian & Markman, 2008; Dahl, 1975; Gelman, 2003;
Lawler, 1973; Leslie, 2007; Pelletier, 2010; Prasada,
2000). Generic statements refer to categories, and so
may be instrumental in children’s category learning.
They are frequent even when speakers explicitly
refrain from offering judgments about that cate-
gory. For example, a parent who scrupulously
avoids gender stereotyping nonetheless may use
generic language about gender (e.g., “Can girls play
football?”; Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004). These
generic references imply that gender is an impor-
tant category within which inferences can be made.
It is unlikely that parents are aware of the implicit
messages conveyed by their use of generics.
Generics are also interesting because they may
reﬂect psychological essentialism. Essentialism is
the implicit belief that certain categories (e.g., dog,
woman, gold) are richly structured “natural kinds”
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that are real, discovered in nature, and inferentially
rich (Gelman, 2003; Medin, 1989). Furthermore,
these natural kinds are thought to have an underly-
ing causal “essence” that makes them the way they
are. Some implications of essentialism are that cate-
gory boundaries are rigid, that category members
share deep similarities, and that surface appear-
ances can be misleading regarding category mem-
bership. Although essentialism misrepresents reality
in important respects (Leslie, 2007; Rhodes &
Gelman, 2009), it is nonetheless commonly evoked
to understand both biological and social kinds
(Gelman, 2003).
Generics are consistent with essentialism in two
ways. First, they express inherent, nonaccidental prop-
erties. For example, the generic statement, “A dog has
four legs,” implies that four leggedness is a stable,
core property of dogs (Cimpian & Markman, 2009;
Gelman & Bloom, 2007; Graham, Nayer, & Gelman,
2011; Hollander, Gelman, & Raman, 2009). In con-
trast, the nongeneric statement, “A dog is missing,”
refers to a property that is only incidental to the cate-
gory of dogs. Second, generics suggest minimal
within-category variability and imply category-wide
similarities that can override superﬁcial variation.
For example, the generic statement, “Dogs are four-
legged,” implies an unvarying body type, despite the
actual existence of three-legged dogs. Thus, generics
express regularities despite the existence of excep-
tions, thereby focusing on within-category common-
alities and glossing over differences.
Furthermore, generics imply even broader gener-
alizability than they express (Cimpian, Brandone, &
Gelman, 2010). Although people produce generics to
express a broad range of generalizations, including
those based on regularities that occur relatively
infrequently (e.g., “Sharks attack humans”), when
people hear a novel generic, they tend to assume
that it holds consistently for the vast majority of
category members. In this way, generics imply a
sameness among category members, consistent with
the essentialist belief that a category has an under-
lying reality that transcends outward variation.
Because generics are consistent with essentialism,
they may provide an important mechanism for
transmitting essentialist ideas to children. When
learning a new animal category, children who hear
generics about that category (e.g., “Zarpies hate ice
cream”) treat the category as more richly structured
than children who hear the same information in
nongeneric form (e.g., “This zarpie hates ice
cream”; Gelman, Ware, & Kleinberg, 2010). Not
only do children learn that the predicates apply
broadly to the category (e.g., that even atypical
zarpies hate ice cream) but also they infer that the
category itself is more stable and inference promot-
ing. The same effects are obtained when children
are taught generics about novel social categories
(e.g., people called zarpies; Rhodes, Leslie, &
Tworek, 2012). Moreover, when parents received an
experimental manipulation that increased their
essentialist beliefs about a novel social category,
they produced more generics about that category
when talking to their children (Rhodes et al., 2012).
These results suggest a bidirectional causal link
between generic language and essentialist beliefs,
when examining language and beliefs about a par-
ticular novel category.
If generics are a mechanism for imparting essen-
tialism, it is important to know whether individual
parents differ in the generic input to their children;
whether such differences are stable over time, con-
texts, and domains; and whether they correspond
to children’s own generic language. Evidence for
the stability of individual differences in generic
production would provide indirect evidence that
generics are linked to underlying conceptual repre-
sentations. Speciﬁcally, stable individual differences
in generic usage would argue against the idea that
generics simply reﬂect transient, superﬁcial, contex-
tual inﬂuences on speech, and may indicate that
people’s use of generics instead reﬂects a stable
conceptual perspective, such as essentialism.
To date, little work has examined the frequency
of generic production across speakers. Generics are
universally expressed across the world’s languages
(Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Mannheim, Gelman,
Escalante, Huayhua, & Puma, 2011; Tardif, Gelman,
Fu, & Zhu, 2012) and are relatively frequent, partic-
ularly within pedagogical contexts (Gelman, Ware,
Manczak, & Graham, 2013). For example, nearly all
parents in a middle-class U.S. sample produced at
least one generic within a brief (10–15 min) book-
reading session (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hart-
man, & Pappas, 1998). However, prior research also
found substantial variation across speakers. In one
controlled, mother–child book-viewing study, the
rate of generic production across individual moth-
ers ranged from 0% to 41% of utterances (Pappas &
Gelman, 1998). Likewise, in a project examining
parent–child conversations about gender in a natu-
ralistic book-reading context, the rate of maternal
generics across speakers ranged from 0% to 67% of
all on-task utterances (Gelman et al., 2004). Even
more remarkably, in the same study, the rate of
child generics across speakers ranged from 0% to
92% of all on-task utterances. In a longitudinal
examination of children’s generics in a small sample
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of eight children ranging from 2 to 4 years of age,
there were sizable individual differences in the rate
of generic production as well: The rates at which
children produced generics at age 2 ranged from
under 0.2% of all utterances in one child to nearly
3% in another child; at age 3, the rates varied from
a low of 0.3% in one child to over 6% in another
(Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008). Further-
more, the data suggested that these differences may
be stable across time, as the rank ordering of the
ﬁve children for whom data were available at all
three ages (2, 3, and 4 years) was identical from
year to year.
Although there may be stable individual differ-
ences in generic production, the evidence to date is
limited to either a single point in time or a very
small sample. Furthermore, individual differences
may reﬂect uncontrolled situational factors. For
example, a child may produce many generics
because her conversational partner initiated a high
rate of generic talk, or because she prefers topics
that happen to support generics more easily (e.g.,
animals vs. artifacts; Brandone & Gelman, 2009), or
because she enjoys interactional contexts that are
more pedagogical and thus evoke more generics
(e.g., book reading vs. toy play; Gelman, Chesnick,
& Waxman, 2005; Gelman et al., 2013). It may also
be that stability in the rates of generic production
between the ages of 2–4 years discussed earlier
(Gelman et al., 2008) reﬂects individual differences
in early linguistic development, which will even
out once children reach a certain level of ﬂuency.
The Present Studies
The present studies were designed to examine
whether individual differences in generic language
production are stable across time, across domains,
and across contexts, when controlling for potentially
confounding factors, such as conversational partner
or topic. We assessed stability over time (conversa-
tions held a few weeks apart) to assess test–retest
reliability. If rate of generic language production is
highly variable to momentary shifts in attention or
experiences, then we would not expect stability
over time. In contrast, if rate of generic language
production is a stable individual difference, then
we would expect signiﬁcant correlations over time.
We assessed stability over domains (e.g., animals vs.
food) to determine whether rate of generics reﬂects
domain-speciﬁc knowledge and interests versus a
broader generic perspective. If generic rates reﬂect
domain-speciﬁc factors, then a child who produces
many generics about one domain (e.g., food) would
not necessarily produce many generics about
another domain (e.g., animals). In contrast, if gen-
eric rates reﬂect a broader conceptual perspective,
then a child who produces many food-focused
generics would be expected also to produce many
animal-focused generics. Finally, we assessed stabil-
ity over contexts (e.g., child talking with parent vs.
researcher [Study 1]; parent–child dyad looking
through pictures vs. playing with toys [Study 2]) to
determine whether stability persists even in the face
of different pragmatic demands, encouraging a
speaker to be pedagogical versus playful versus
analytic, and so forth. If pragmatic demands of the
context primarily determine the rate of generics,
then we would not expect consistency across con-
texts. However, if there are stable tendencies to be
more or less generic, then we would expect consis-
tency across contexts.
We also ask whether parents’ generic usage corre-
lates with their essentialism. We predicted that rates
of generic production would correlate with beliefs
that categories are stable, as generics express stabil-
ity, from a semantic analysis. However, it was also
of interest to test whether rates of generic production
would correlate with a range of other essentialist
beliefs, such as inheritance, inductive potential, and
so forth. (see Gelman, 2003, for review).
We focused on preschool children and their par-
ents. The parents provide evidence regarding not
only the adult endpoint but also the language that
children hear. The children provide evidence
regarding individual differences early in develop-
ment. Furthermore, by examining parents and their
children, we are able to examine intergenerational
relations in speech patterns. Study 1 examined
4-year-old children’s and their parents’ generics
when in conversation with each other and a third,
neutral party (a researcher), when engaged in a
book-reading task at two distinct time points. We
focused on 4-year-olds because they produce generics
at roughly the same rate as adults (Gelman et al.,
2008) and readily produce generics on an elicitation
task (Brandone & Gelman, 2009; Hollander, Gel-
man, & Star, 2002), yet show tremendous individ-
ual variability in generic rates in natural language
transcripts (Gelman et al., 2004). Study 2 examined
2- and 4-year-old children’s and their parents’
generics when engaged in conversation with each
other when looking at pictures (pedagogical) and
when playing with toys (nonpedagogical), to exam-
ine stability of individual differences across distinct
contexts. We included 2-year-olds as well as 4-year-
olds in Study 2 because the younger children
are just beginning to produce generics and so
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provide important evidence regarding initial varia-
tion. The speech elicitation tasks varied two critical
factors, conversational domain and context, that
will be discussed at greater length in the Method
sections.
Study 1
Method
Participants
Participants were 4-year-olds (N = 72; 36 boys,
36 girls) and their parents (N = 72; 1 father, 71
mothers). Children ranged in age from 4.0 to 5.0 at
the ﬁrst session (mean age = 4.6 years at the ﬁrst
session; mean age = 4.7 years at the second
session). Children were primarily White (60 White,
2 African American, 1 Asian, 4 multiracial, 3 other,
and 2 not reported). Parents ranged in age from 21
to 46 years (mean age = 36 years) and were primar-
ily White. An additional seven dyads were tested
but not included because they could not be sched-
uled for their second visit within 4 weeks of their
ﬁrst visit.
Materials
Four different picture books were used, each
with 15 pages. Each page depicted a full-color, real-
istic drawing of one item. There were ﬁve animals
(e.g., frog, skunk), ﬁve foods (e.g., corn, pie), and
ﬁve people (e.g., old lady, doctor) per book, for a
total of 60 items across the four books. A puppet
that looked like an alien creature was used to help
elicit conversation with the children.
Procedure
Each dyad came to an on-campus, child-friendly
laboratory for two visits (spaced 3–4 weeks apart;
mean delay between visits was 24 days). At each
visit, the dyad completed three tasks: (a) the parent
and the child looked through and discussed a pic-
ture book together, (b) the child looked through
and discussed a picture book individually with a
researcher, and (c) the parent looked through and
discussed a picture book individually with a differ-
ent researcher. Thus, each participant completed
four sessions (e.g., the child sessions were as
follows: child with parent, Visit 1; child with
researcher, Visit 1; child with parent, Visit 2; child
with researcher, Visit 2). The parent–child conversa-
tion occurred ﬁrst, followed by both the
parent–researcher and child–researcher conversa-
tions (which took place simultaneously, in two dif-
ferent testing rooms with two different researchers).
Each participant viewed all four picture books
across the two visits. Two different books were
used for the two parent–child sessions. For the ses-
sions with the researcher, the same book was used
for both child–researcher and parent–researcher ses-
sions at a given visit (e.g., for Dyad 1, both parent
and child looked through Book B with a researcher
at Visit 1 and both parent and child looked through
Book D with a researcher at Visit 2). The assign-
ment of books to session and visit was counterbal-
anced. The order of pages within each book was
randomized separately for each dyad, with the con-
straint that no more than two pages in a row were
of the same domain (person, animal, or food).
For the parent–child sessions, parents were asked
simply to talk about the book with their child as
they normally would at home, and to try to look at
every page. For the researcher–child sessions, pilot
testing revealed that some children would not
talk when simply asked to talk about the pic-
tures. Therefore, to elicit conversation in the child–
researcher sessions, the researcher introduced an
alien puppet named Zorg, who “doesn’t know
much” and needed the child’s help (see Hollander
et al., 2002). The child was directed to talk to the
puppet as well as the researcher. The ﬁrst two
pages of the book were practice trials concerning
artifacts, and not included in the analyses. For each
of the two practice trials, the researcher asked one
speciﬁc and one generic prompt (e.g., one child
would hear: “What can you tell me about this
bike?” and “Zorg doesn’t know anything about
chairs. Can you tell him about chairs?”; another
child would hear: “What can you tell me about
bikes?” and “Zorg doesn’t know anything about
this chair. Can you tell him about this chair?”). The
ﬁrst prompt always was a request from the
researcher; the second prompt always invoked Zorg
as not knowing anything. The order of the practice
trials (bike vs. chair) and order of wording (generic
ﬁrst vs. speciﬁc ﬁrst) was fully counterbalanced.
The prompts were included to convey that both
speciﬁc language and generic language were appro-
priate, and to remind the children that Zorg was
ignorant. After the practice trials, neither speciﬁc
nor generic prompts were used. Each page began
with the experimenter asking, “What is this?”
(unless the child spontaneously labeled the picture
ﬁrst). The experimenter then provided nondirective,
scripted prompts, for example, “What more can
you tell me?” “Zorg doesn’t know much about this
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one; Can you help him out?” “You can say what-
ever you’d like.” The experimenter aimed to elicit
at least two nonlabeling facts about each page,
before continuing to the next page. For the parent–
researcher sessions, the experimenter asked the
parent to just say whatever came to mind when
they saw each picture. If the parent asked whether
they should talk as if speaking to their child, they
were told to talk as they would with another adult.
Nondirective, scripted prompts were provided (e.g.,
“What more can you tell me?” “Can you say a little
bit more?”). For each new picture with the child or
mother, if the participant did not spontaneously
provide a label, the experimenter asked for a label
(e.g., “What is this?”). All sessions were videotaped
with informed consent.
At the end of Visit 1, parents also completed a
brief demographic questionnaire to assess parental
age, ethnicity, and educational attainment. At the
end of Visit 2, children were administered the
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) to assess
their vocabulary, and standard scores were calculated.
At the same time, parents completed an essential-
ism questionnaire to assess the extent to which they
construe various trait categories as stable, immuta-
ble, and richly structured (adapted from Gelman,
Heyman, & Legare, 2007). The essentialism ques-
tionnaire focused on 20 traits (anxious, artistic,
athletic, cautious, feminine, goal-oriented, having a
good sense of direction, humorous, intelligent, mas-
culine, mathematically talented, messy, musically
talented, neat, nurturing, outgoing, pessimistic,
responsible, shy, and stubborn). For each, we
assessed seven dimensions of essentialist reasoning
(listed in the Appendix, using “shy” as the sample
characteristic).
Results
Coding
All sessions were transcribed verbatim from the
video recordings and checked by a second tran-
scriber. Utterance breaks were determined by the
presence of a new subject noun phrase. Thus, “Does
he like to live where it’s cold or hot?” constituted a
single utterance, whereas, “Does he live in the
water or does he live on the ground?” was split
into two utterances (“Does he live in the water?”
“Or does he live on the ground?”).
Coding proceeded in two waves. The ﬁrst wave
included four steps. First, each utterance was coded
as intelligible or unintelligible. Utterances were
counted as unintelligible if all or most of the
content was inaudible; 99% of utterances were intelli-
gible. Second, intelligible utterances were coded as
on or off task; 89% of intelligible utterances were on
task. Off-task utterances were not related in any way
to the picture, or to the conversation prompted by
the picture. For example, any procedural discussion
(e.g., “Two more pages after this”) was coded as off
task. In contrast, comments about the content of the
pictures in the book were coded as on task (e.g.,
“What is the next one?”). Third, on-task utterances
were coded as either containing a noun or pronoun,
or not. Finally, on-task utterances containing a noun
or pronoun were coded as generic or nongeneric,
using criteria developed in prior research (Gelman
et al., 1998; Gelman et al., 2004). Generic utterances
by deﬁnition required a noun phrase, and included
reference to a category in general. Sample child utter-
ances that were coded as generic include: “And
sharks could eat dolphins”; “A grandma comes to
visit you a lot”; “Race cars go really fast.” Sample
child utterances that were coded as nongeneric
include: “And the ﬁreman rescued the lady”; “I have
a lot of ﬁre alarms in my house”; “This is a broccoli.”
Table 1 provides more examples.
Table 1
Study 1, Sample Generic and Nongeneric Utterances Produced by
Children (With Subject Number in Parentheses)
Generic
You can eat popcorn. (11)
They’re [witches] pretend. (16)
Cats have sharp claws and are family to a lion. (22)
Ducks ﬂoat on water. (23)
I love butterﬂies. (34)
And Morg [sic], penguins ﬂap their wings. (42)
You eat pretzels. (44)
I mean, I don’t like skunks. (49)
Um and turtles are creatures that crawl in hot places like the
desert. (56)
Yeah, it [alligator] eats people. (57)
Crackers go in soup. (64)
A frog usually hops, all day long. (72)
Nongeneric
He needs a helmet if the football hits her [sic]. (11)
Oh Mommy, this is so cute. (16)
Zorg, this is a cat. (22)
Short legs, little head, black spots. [ladybug] (23)
He’s a judge. (34)
Ew, look at its [ladybug’s] face. (42)
It’s yellow. (44)
He is big and strong. (49)
I have a puppy. (child 56)
A birdie. [penguin] (57)
A ballerina. (child 64)
A banana. (72)
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A second wave of coding was conducted to pro-
vide a more conservative coding of generics. Specif-
ically, those utterances in which the only generic
was a pronoun that can be loosely translated as
“one” (typically “you” or “we”; e.g., “We call it yel-
low”; “This is a cracker that you eat”) were recoded
as nongeneric. We recoded such utterances because
they may be indeﬁnite (akin to “someone”) rather
than generic. Altogether, 10.8% of utterances that
had been coded as generic in Wave 1 were recoded
as nongeneric in Wave 2.
To determine interrater reliability, all transcripts
that had not been used for training purposes were
coded by two independent raters. Disagreements
were resolved by discussion. We report interrater
reliability for each of the two coding waves
separately. For Wave 1, interrater reliability was
calculated on N = 62 transcripts from the mother–
child context at Visit 1, N = 63 transcripts from the
researcher–child context at Visit 1, and N = 72 for
all other pairings of context and visit. The Wave 1
agreement and kappas were as follows: intelligibil-
ity agreement = 99.7%, intelligibility kappas = .88;
on-task agreement = 97%, on-task kappas = .87;
noun phrase agreement = 98%, noun phrase
kappas = .95; generic agreement = 94%, generic
kappas = .83. Because Wave 2 only involved the
coding of generics, interrater reliability for Wave 2
is reported for generic coding only (N = 67): agree-
ment = 99%, kappas = .96. All the kappas fall
within near-perfect (.81 and above) levels (Landis &
Koch, 1977).
Generic Production Scores
So that individual differences were not
confounded by speaker’s overall talkativeness, our
measures of generic production were not raw scores
of generic frequency, but rather the number of gener-
ics divided by the number of on-task utterances.
However, it was also important to ensure that rates
of generic production were not simply a reﬂection of
participants’ rate of producing nouns or pronouns.
Participants differed in how frequently they pro-
duced responses without a noun or pronoun (e.g.,
“Yes,” “OK,” “Right”), and we wished to make sure
that differences in rates of generic production could
not be attributed to such stylistic differences. To test
this, we examined two different ways of computing
generic production scores: (a) number of generics
divided by the number of all on-task utterances
versus (b) number of generics divided by the number
of all on-task utterances including a noun or pro-
noun. We calculated each of these scores separately
for mothers and children within each context and
visit. We then examined the correlations between
the two scoring methods for each combination of
participant, context, and visit, resulting in eight cor-
relations. The results showed that these two meth-
ods correlated extremely highly, with Pearson
correlations ranging from rs(70) = .94–.99, ps < .001.
Thus, calculating a generic production score using
on-task utterances as the denominator provides an
accurate estimate of generic rate and does not
reﬂect “noun-iness” per se.
Using this method, we computed four generic
production scores for each participant within each
book-reading event: (a) the number of generics on
the animal pages divided by the number of on-task
utterances on the animal pages, (b) the number of
generics on the food pages divided by the number
of on-task utterances on the food pages, (c) the
number of generics on the person pages divided by
the number of on-task utterances on the person
pages, and (d) the total number of generics divided
by the total number of on-task utterances.
Because each speaker participated in four book-
viewing sessions across the two visits (parent–child
Visit 1, parent–child Visit 2, participant–researcher
Visit 1, participant–researcher Visit 2), there were
32 generic production scores per dyad: 2 (speak-
ers) 9 4 (sessions) 9 4 (scores). These data were
analyzed to examine frequency of generics, individ-
ual consistency, and which nonlinguistic factors
predict generic production.
Frequency of Generics
Before turning to the analyses investigating
individual consistency, we provide a descriptive
portrait of the rate of generic production across
contexts, visits, speakers, and domains. We con-
ducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the
proportion of generic utterances, with laboratory
visit (ﬁrst, second), context (speaking with each
other or with a researcher), and domains (people,
animals, food) as within-subject variables, and
speaker (parent, child) as a between-subject vari-
able. Both children and parents produced signiﬁ-
cantly more generics when speaking with the
researcher than with each other (see Figure 1), F(1,
142) = 74.29, p < .001, g2p = .34. This context effect
may reﬂect the greater shared experiences of the
parent and child, which tend to be speciﬁc. For
example, parent–child dyads often reminisced
about a particular event (e.g., “Hey yeah, we got
you a turtle last year at the ﬂower place, remem-
ber?”). In contrast, participants had no such shared
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context with the researcher, and thus may have
been less likely to discuss speciﬁc contexts and
more likely to refer to general knowledge. Interest-
ingly, there was also a signiﬁcant interaction
between speaker and context, F(1, 142) = 26.23,
p < .001, g2p = .16. Although parents produced more
generics than children in the parent–child conversa-
tions, p < .001, children produced more generics
than parents when speaking with a researcher,
p = .01. In the Discussion, we interpret these effects
as reﬂecting a tendency to produce more generics
within pedagogical than nonpedagogical contexts
(see also Gelman et al., 2013). Whereas parents
assumed a pedagogical role when speaking with
their children, given the greater expertise of the
parents, children assumed a pedagogical role when
speaking with the researcher because they were
encouraged to provide information for the alien
puppet who knew very little.
The remaining signiﬁcant effects involved
domain. Generics were much more frequent regard-
ing animals and food than people (.18, .17, and .08,
respectively), F(2, 284) = 191.46, p < .001, g2p = .57
(ps < .001 for the pairwise comparisons involving
people; p > .12 for the pairwise comparison of
animals and food). However, domain interacted
with speaker, F(2, 284) = 22.32, p < .001, g2p = .14.
Whereas generics about animals and food were pro-
duced at fairly equivalent rates by parents and chil-
dren (animals: .19 and .18, respectively, p > .5;
food: .19 and .16, respectively, p = .056), children
were more likely to produce generics about people
than were their parents (.10 and .06, respectively,
p = .011). This unexpected result may suggest
greater essentialism on the part of children (Taylor,
Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009), or a tendency on the part
of parents to avoid talking about types of people,
perhaps judging this to be potentially rude or
offensive. Finally, domain interacted with context,
F(2, 284) = 7.01, p = .001, g2p = .05. Although ani-
mals and food elicited more generics than people in
both the mother–child and researcher context, there
was a slight tendency for speakers to produce more
generics about animals than food in the researcher
context only (Ms = .24 and .22, respectively,
p < .01).
There were no other signiﬁcant effects, including
no signiﬁcant effects of visit, F(1, 142) < 1.0.
Accordingly, we collapsed over visit in the correla-
tional analyses reported below.
Individual Consistency
We conducted Pearson correlations to examine
consistency in generic production across time, con-
texts, and domains. As shown in Table 2, all 18 of
these correlations were positive, and 17 of 18
reached statistical signiﬁcance. The analysis of con-
sistency over time examined the correlation
between the rate of generic production on the ﬁrst
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Figure 1. Study 1, mean proportion of on-task utterances that included a generic, produced by parent and children when speaking to
each other and when speaking to a researcher, by domain. P-C = parents-children.
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laboratory visit with the rate of generic production
on the second laboratory visit, for parents and chil-
dren separately within each conversational context
(parent–child and researcher). Both parents and
children were highly consistent across visits when
speaking with a researcher. Consistency across vis-
its was lower for the parent–child context, although
it was signiﬁcantly positive for parents. The analy-
sis of consistency over context examined the corre-
lation between the rate of generic production in the
parent–child context with the rate of generic pro-
duction in the researcher context, for parents and
children separately. Both parents and children dis-
played consistency whether speaking with a family
member or a researcher. Finally, the analysis of con-
sistency over domain examined the correlation
between the rate of generic production for animals,
people, and food with one another, for parents and
children separately within each conversational con-
text (parent–child and researcher). Correlations
were consistently high across domains, particularly
for the researcher context.
In addition, we examined consistency across
speakers (within dyads), separately for each con-
text. Within the parent–child context, correlations
between parents and children were high, r(70) = .63,
p < .001. However, within the researcher context,
there was no signiﬁcant correlation between parents
and children, r(70) = .05, p > .60.
Relation of Nonlinguistic Factors to Generic Production
In this last set of analyses, we examined whether
rate of generic usage related to other factors, such
as child age, child vocabulary, or parent education.
If so, it would be important to determine if the cor-
relations examined above obtain when the relevant
factors are controlled. Child age and parent educa-
tion displayed no signiﬁcant relation with generic
production of either parent or child in either the
parent–child or the researcher context, ps > .40.
PPVT standard scores were also not signiﬁcantly
related to generic production, although the correla-
tion approached signiﬁcance with children’s gener-
ics in the researcher context, r(70) = .23, p = .053.
We therefore conducted partial correlations for all
the analyses in the Individual Consistency section,
controlling for PPVT score. All the signiﬁcant
effects remained signiﬁcant, with one exception:
the correlation between children’s generics in the
parent–child context and children’s generics in the
researcher contexts reduced slightly, to r(69) = .22,
p = .068.
We next examined whether rate of generic usage
corresponds to parental essentialism. We assessed
seven aspects of essentialism: stability over time,
innate predisposition, inheritance from birth parent,
genetic basis, detectability in babies, resistance to
environmental inﬂuence, and resistance to change.
We calculated separate correlations for each of
these dimensions. Six of the seven dimensions
showed no signiﬁcant relations to generic produc-
tion; however, the dimension of stability consis-
tently correlated with generic production rates, for
both children—r(70) = .27 in parent–child context,
p < .05; r(70) = .35 in researcher context, p < .01—
and parents—r(70) = .24 in parent–child context,
p < .05; r(70) = .21 in researcher context, p < .10. In
other words, parents who judged traits to be more
stable and unchanging over time produced generics
at a higher rate and had children who produced
generics at a higher rate. Overall, parents tended
toward the essentialist end of this scale assessing
stability, with scores on a scale of 1–6 (averaged
over the 20 traits) ranging from 3.6 (indicating a
slight tendency for traits to be stable over time) to
5.9 (indicating almost complete stability for every
trait).
Discussion
Study 1 revealed stable individual differences in
the tendency to produce generic language. The rate
at which speakers produced generics was highly
consistent over time (from Visit 1 to Visit 2), over
contexts (parent–child conversations vs. conversa-
tions with a researcher), over domains (animals,
people, and food), and within dyads (parents who
produced relatively more generics had children
Table 2
Study 1, Pearson Correlations Examining Consistency Over Time,
Contexts, and Domains (All dfs = 70)
Parents Children
Consistency over time
Visit 1 ~ Visit 2 (researcher context) .75*** .69***
Visit 1 ~ Visit 2 (parent–child context) .35** .16
Consistency over context
Parent–child ~ Researcher contexts .36** .25*
Consistency over domain
Animal ~ People (researcher context) .62*** .82***
Animal ~ Food (researcher context) .76*** .80***
People ~ Food (researcher context) .55*** .75***
Animal ~ People (parent–child context) .53*** .35**
Animal ~ Food (parent–child context) .47*** .39**
People ~ Food (parent–child context) .29* .24*
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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who produced relatively more generics). Further-
more, these differences correlated with parents’
beliefs about the stability of categories over time,
which is one component of essentialist reasoning.
Although we cannot draw conclusions about cau-
sality from correlational evidence, these ﬁndings
suggest that adults’ rate of generic language
production may reﬂect conceptual differences in
essentialism.
One limitation of Study 1 is that all the contexts
involved looking through picture books with a sim-
ilar structure. The consistency of context had the
advantage of ensuring that individual differences
cannot be due to variations in selected activity or
content. However, this controlled, unvarying,
highly pedagogical activity may have prompted
greater consistency and thus inﬂated the cross-con-
text correlations. Perhaps cross-context consistency
would not occur if the contexts differed from one
another in the kinds of interaction they afford. We
conducted Study 2 to address this question. Speciﬁ-
cally, we systematically varied the pedagogical nat-
ure of the interactional contexts by examining
parent–child conversations in both a picture exami-
nation context and a toy play context. Children
were drawn from two different age groups to
examine these patterns over development.
Study 2
Study 2 examined consistency of generics across
two distinct interactional contexts: looking at pic-
tures and playing with toys. Looking at pictures is
assumed to be a more pedagogical context than
playing with toys. Pictures are often presented in a
book-reading context, and are treated as representa-
tions (Gelman et al., 2005). In contrast, toys elicit
more focus on the affordances of the item as an
individual object. Parents and children use more
noun phrases and more generics when looking at
pictures versus playing with toys, and more verbs
and a greater focus on individuating phrases when
playing with toys than looking at pictures (Gelman
& Tardif, 1998; Gelman et al., 2005; Tardif, Gelman,
& Xu, 1999). Interactions with toys are also more
playful than interactions with pictures (e.g., during
toy play, participants more often talk to the item or
give it a proper name; Gelman et al., 2005).
Study 2 was a secondary analysis of data that
had previously been gathered for a project on par-
ent–child talk about conceptual relations (e.g., taxo-
nomic, thematic) as a function of representational
medium (pictures vs. objects; Ware, Gelman, &
Kleinberg, 2013). Although the prior project did not
include coding of generics, the data set is well sui-
ted to the questions posed in this study. Partici-
pants were parent–child dyads, with conversations
in two different interactional contexts in which all
dyads received the same setting and basic informa-
tional content (animals, food, artifacts). The data set
allows us to examine consistency within dyads,
across contexts, and across domains. To the extent
that consistency is obtained, it cannot be due to
individual variation in context or topic, given the
controlled settings.
Importantly, the previously published report
showed clear differences between the picture con-
text and the object context in interactional patterns,
suggesting that these contexts are distinct in their
pedagogical nature. Pictures elicited more taxo-
nomic relations (e.g., indicating that different items
are animals) and shared property relations (e.g.,
indicating that a pear and corn are both healthy),
whereas objects elicited more thematic relations
(e.g., indicating that a hammer could be used to
pound on a watermelon) and slot-ﬁller relations
(e.g., indicating that a ﬁsh eats ice cream and an
elephant eats ice cream). Pictures also tended to eli-
cit more conventional relations than objects, which
elicited more playful and unconventional relations.
In Study 2, we recoded these parent–child inter-
actions with regard to generic language, as well as
the domain content of each generic (as animal,
food, artifact, or other). These data were then ana-
lyzed to determine the consistency of individual
differences in generic usage.
Method
Participants
Participants were 2-year-olds (N = 16; 8 boys, 8
girls; mean age = 2.9; range = 2.5–3.1), 4-year-olds
(N = 16; 8 boys, 8 girls; mean age = 4.3; range =
3.7–5.0), and their parents (N = 32; all females). All
participants were White. An additional four dyads
were tested but not included (two failed to com-
plete the task, one spoke non-English, and one was
unintelligible).
Materials
Each dyad received items in two blocks (pictures,
toys), in counterbalanced order. The toys were
small replica objects. Each picture was a laminated
card depicting a color, realistic drawing of one of
the toys. There were 12 pictures and 12 toys per
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dyad, equally divided among animals, foods, and
artifacts (Ware et al., 2013). Thus, each dyad
received one block containing four pictures of ani-
mals, four pictures of foods, and four pictures of
artifacts, and another block containing four toy ani-
mals, four toy foods, and four toy artifacts. Within
a dyad, the pictures and toys represented 24 differ-
ent categories, but across dyads, each category was
presented as a picture for half the participants and
as a toy for half the participants, matched in
appearance (e.g., half the dyads saw a toy elephant,
whereas half saw a drawing of the same toy
elephant). The animals included cow, crab, eagle,
elephant, ﬁsh, frog, lion, and pig; the food included
corn, French fries, hotdog, ice cream, lemon, pear,
pizza, and watermelon; and the artifacts included
airplane, couch, hammer, house, piano, shoe, table,
and truck.
Procedure
Parent–child dyads were brought to a child-
friendly laboratory at a university and video
recorded while interacting with one another in two
back-to-back, counterbalanced sessions. One session
involved looking through a set of 12 cards; the
other involved playing with a set of 12 objects (see
Materials, above). Participants were instructed to
play as they normally did at home, but were asked
to spend time with each item. The dyads with 2-
year-olds were given 8 min per session; the dyads
with 4-year-olds were given 10 min per session.
Results
Coding
Coding was conducted from transcriptions
prepared for the previous project (Ware et al.,
2013). First, each utterance was coded as either on
task and intelligible or off task (including unintelli-
gible); 89% of utterances were intelligible and on
task. Second, every on-task utterance was coded as
generic or nongeneric, using the criteria from the
second wave of Study 1. Third, every generic utter-
ance was coded for domain (animal, food, artifact,
or other). Nongeneric utterances were not coded for
domain because such lines often were ambiguous
as to domain, given that items from multiple
domains were simultaneously available to partici-
pants.
Two independent raters coded a subset of tran-
scripts, with disagreements resolved by discussion.
For generic coding, agreement (N = 28 transcripts)
was 99% and kappa was .91. For content coding,
agreement (N = 16 transcripts, 1 context each) was
97% and kappa was .93. All the kappas are within
near-perfect levels (Landis & Koch, 1977).
Frequency of Generics
We computed four generic production scores for
each participant within each context (pictures vs.
toys): (a) the number of generics regarding animals
divided by the total number of on-task utterances,
(b) the number of generics regarding food divided
by the total number of on-task utterances, (c) the
number of generics regarding artifacts divided by
the total number of on-task utterances, and (d) the
total number of generics divided by the total num-
ber of on-task utterances. For each domain, the
generic production scores were divided by the total
number of on-task utterances (rather than the num-
ber of on-task utterances for that domain, as in
Study 1) because domain was coded for generics
only.
To assess the rate of generic production across
contexts, speakers, and domains, we conducted an
ANOVA on the proportion of generic utterances,
with context (pictures vs. toys) and domain (people,
animals, food) as within-subject variables, and
speaker (parent, child) and age group (2- and 4-
year-olds) as between-subject variables (see
Figure 2). An initial analysis revealed no signiﬁcant
effects involving block order, so that factor was
excluded from further analyses. Parents produced
more generics than children (Ms = .022 and .01,
respectively), F(1, 60) = 16.15, p < .001, g2p = .21.
Pictures elicited more generics than objects
(Ms = .018 and .013, respectively). F(1, 60) = 6.26,
p = .015, g2p = .09. There was also a main effect of
domain, F(2, 120) = 18.64, p < .001, g2p = .24. Post
hoc comparisons revealed that generics were more
frequent for animals (M = .021) and food (M = .021)
than for artifacts (M = .006), ps < .001, with no
differences between animals and food. Finally, there
was a Context 9 Domain interaction, F(2, 120) =
3.84, p = .024, g2p = .06. The generic advantage for
pictures over objects was signiﬁcantly maintained in
both the food and artifact domains, ps < .05, but not
in the animal domain, where generics were consis-
tently high in both contexts.
Individual Consistency
We conducted partial Pearson correlations, con-
trolling for age, to examine consistency in the pro-
duction of generics across contexts and domains
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(Table 3). The analysis of consistency over context
examined the correlation between the rate of gen-
eric production in the picture context with the rate
of generic production in the toy context, for parents
and children separately. Both parents and children
displayed consistency over context. The analysis of
consistency over domain examined the correlation
between the rate of generic production for animals,
food, and artifacts with one another, for parents
and children separately within each conversational
context (picture and toy). Correlations were signiﬁ-
cantly positive across certain domains, although
they differed across contexts. With pictures, signiﬁ-
cant correlations were obtained when comparing
animal and food generics, for both children and
parents. In contrast, with toys, signiﬁcant correla-
tions were obtained when comparing food and arti-
facts, for both children and parents.
We also examined consistency across speakers,
separately for each context, again controlling for
age. Within both the picture and the toy contexts,
correlations between parents and children were
high: for pictures, r(29) = .63, p < .001; for toys,
r(29) = .54, p < .01.
Discussion
Study 2 replicated several ﬁndings of Study 1,
including consistency over contexts, within dyads,
and over some domains. Most notably, participants
were consistent across contexts, even though the
contexts were more varied in Study 2 than in Study
1. The picture context was more pedagogical, elicit-
ing more generics, more talk about taxonomic rela-
tions, more shared property relations, and more
conventional relations. In contrast, the object play
context was more nonpedagogical, eliciting fewer
generics, more talk about thematic links, more slot-
ﬁller relations, and more unconventional relations.
Informal impressions conﬁrmed that the picture
context elicited more pedagogical interactions (e.g.,
participants declared search rules, such as ﬁnding
pictures that matched on a certain dimension),
whereas the object context elicited more playful
interactions (e.g., speaking for the animals, or
engaging in pretense). Nonetheless, children and
mothers who produced relatively more generics in
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Figure 2. Study 2, mean proportion of on-task utterances that included a generic, produced by parent and children when looking at
pictures and when playing with toys, by domain.
Table 3
Study 2, Pearson Correlations Examining Consistency Over Time,
Contexts, and Domains, Partialing Out Age (All dfs = 29)
Parents Children
Consistency over context
Pictures ~ Toys .30* .66***
Consistency over domain
Animal ~ Food (picture context) .44* .48**
Animal ~ Artifact (picture context) .21 .12
Food ~ Artifact (picture context) .03 .00
Animal ~ Food (toy context) .02 .04
Animal ~ Artifact (toy context) .27 .16
Food ~ Artifact (toy context) .40* .68***
*p < .05, one tailed. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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one context also did so in the other context. Thus,
the consistency over contexts obtained in Study 1
was not solely due to the fact that the contexts were
so similar (a book-reading task).
Also as in Study 1, we found that children and
mothers were highly consistent with one another.
Thus, dyads where mothers produced many gener-
ics tended to be those where children produced
many generics. However, we cannot determine
from Study 2 whether this consistency is due to
factors present within the conversation (e.g., parents
and children focusing on common topics) or to a
more general correspondence between the language
of parents and their children.
We also examined consistency across domains in
this study. Here, we obtained some ﬁndings that
mirrored those of Study 1, as well as some ﬁndings
that did not. As in Study 1, the tendency to pro-
duce generics in one domain was not wholly inde-
pendent of the tendency to produce generics in
other domains. It thus cannot be that high levels of
generics strictly reﬂect expertise or interest in a par-
ticular domain. However, only 4 of the 12 cross-
domain correlations were signiﬁcant in Study 2 (as
compared to all the cross-domain correlations in
Study 1). In part this may reﬂect lower statistical
power, due to a smaller N and the inclusion of just
one visit instead of two. However, another possibil-
ity is that the differences in how we computed the
domain-speciﬁc generic scores were responsible for
the differences. Recall that in Study 1, scores were
computed wholly within domain (e.g., the number
of generic utterances regarding animals divided by
the number of total utterances regarding animals),
whereas in Study 2, the scores were not computed
wholly within domain (e.g., the number of generic
utterances regarding animals divided by the num-
ber of total utterances across all domains). This
change in Study 2 was necessitated by the fact that
many utterances referred to multiple domains, or to
no one clear domain. However, it resulted in a less
sensitive measure than in Study 1, which may have
contributed to the null ﬁndings. In any case, for
those correlations that are signiﬁcant, we ﬁnd a
positive relation in frequency of generics across
domains, for children and parents.
General Discussion
These studies reveal marked variation in how often
children and parents talk about categories as
opposed to particular instances. Each individual saw
the same items and received the same prompts,
thus controlling for context and content. Sometimes
speakers described particular items at hand (e.g.,
“Is that a baby horsie or a big horsie?”), sometimes
speakers reminisced about prior events in their lives
(e.g., “Oh, remember when we passed that elephant
at the zoo?”), and sometimes—of greatest interest
to the current investigation—speakers used the pic-
tures or objects as a jumping-off point to talk about
the categories they represented using generic noun
phrases (e.g., “And where do frogs live?”). How
often people Spontaneously evoked generics varied
considerably: Some people never produced a single
generic, whereas others produced generics on
nearly two thirds of their utterances.
Our primary question is whether variation in
generic production reﬂects stable individual differ-
ences. In other words, are some people consistently
more focused on generic kinds than others? One
possibility is that there is no consistency. The use of
generics could be highly variable, reﬂecting shifts in
a person’s attention or recent experiences. Similarly,
a person who produces a high rate of generics
about a category for which he or she has special
interest or knowledge may be highly speciﬁc about
other categories. We already know that rate of
generics reﬂects content (more generics regarding
animals than artifacts; Brandone & Gelman, 2009)
and context (picture books eliciting more generics
than toys; Gelman et al., 2005).
However, the current ﬁndings show stable indi-
vidual differences in how likely a person is to talk
about generic categories. All three measures of sta-
bility (time, context, and domain) show consistency,
for both children and their parents. First, in Study 1
both parents and children exhibited consistency
across the two visits, 3–4 weeks apart. Parents
were highly consistent whether speaking with a
researcher or speaking with their child. Children
also displayed strong consistency across visits
when talking with a researcher, although not when
talking with a parent. Recall that the researcher
provided only neutral and minimal prompts (e.g.,
“Can you tell me more?”), which may have reduced
contextual pulls toward particular topics and thus
increased consistency. In any case, although the
content of the particular books differed across
visits, the rate of generic production was highly
predictable over time.
Second, participants showed consistency across
two contexts. In Study 1, the contexts were speak-
ing with a family member (in a parent–child dyad)
and speaking with a researcher. For both parents
and children, although the level of generic produc-
tion varied across contexts, those who produced
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more generics in one context tended to produce
more generics in another context. Thus, whether
talking with a family member who knows you well,
has a shared history, and is contributing richly to
the conversation, or talking with a relative stranger
who provides a scripted interaction with minimal
cues, rate of generic language is fairly stable. Simi-
larly, in Study 2, parents and children were highly
consistent in their generic production across a peda-
gogical context (looking through pictures) and a
nonpedagogical context (playing with toys). The
cross-context consistency in Study 2 was particu-
larly striking, given that the two contexts elicited
markedly different kinds of language (more peda-
gogical, generic, taxonomic, and conventional
language in the picture context compared to the
toy context).
Third, participants exhibited some consistency in
their generic production across domains, although
this differed by study. In Study 1, we assessed
cross-domain consistency by varying the content of
the pages in the picture books. Although speakers
were much more likely to produce generics regard-
ing animals and food than people, relative rates of
generic language production were highly stable
across domains (e.g., those who were more generic
about animals tended to be more generic about
foods and people). Again, this stability held true for
both parents and their young children. In Study 2,
we assessed cross-domain consistency by varying
the content of pictures and toys. Generics were
more frequent about animals and foods than arti-
facts, replicating prior research (e.g., Gelman et al.,
1998). Moreover, both parents and children showed
some consistency across domains, although this
ﬁnding was variable (i.e., there were no signiﬁcant
cross-domain correlations involving artifact pictures
or animal toys).
Given these ﬁndings, a key question is why
some people produce generics more than others.
Rate of generic production cannot be attributed to
talkativeness (as the dependent measures controlled
for the amount of talk) or tendency to produce
nouns (as rates of generic production in Study 1 are
nearly identical when one restricts the analysis to
only utterances containing nouns). However, a vari-
ety of other factors may contribute to speakers’ ten-
dency to use generics, including their view that
categories are an important or interesting topic of
conversation (perhaps inﬂuenced by their motiva-
tion to engage in pedagogical interactions), their
history with hearing generic language in the past,
or stylistic speech preferences. For example, just as
certain speakers demonstrate preferences for ques-
tions, imperatives, adverbs, or ﬁllers, there may be
a linguistic preference for generics. The stability
estimates might also be inﬂuenced by more general
priming factors, such as syntactic priming (Gelman
& Raman, 2007; Shimpi, Gamez, Huttenlocher, &
Vasilyeva, 2007) or contextual priming (e.g., due to
the conversations all taking place in a laboratory
setting).
We also investigated whether generic production
reﬂects conceptual attitudes, given that other
features of spontaneous language production have
been shown to reﬂect important conceptual attitudes.
For example, a speaker’s use of pronouns, preposi-
tions, and articles predicts important personal
characteristics, such as personality, conﬁdence,
truthfulness, or romantic compatibility (Pennebaker,
2011). Indeed, we found that variation in generic
language reﬂects differences in one aspect of essen-
tialism. Study 1 examined parents’ essentialist beliefs
about a range of 20 personal traits, using a ques-
tionnaire task. Traits were included because they
evoke more varied beliefs than animal categories
(e.g., adults differ substantially in the extent to
which they believe that intelligence is inborn and
ﬁxed; Dweck, 2006; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Taylor
et al., 2009). The questionnaire measured seven
dimensions of essentialist reasoning, ranging from
beliefs that traits can be discerned by genetic test-
ing, to beliefs that traits cannot change as a function
of desires. Results indicated that parents who held
the belief that trait categories are stable over time
were more likely to produce generics. None of
the other measures of essentialism correlated with
generic language. However, it is perhaps not
surprising that stability was the one dimension that
was predictive. Generics imply that a predicate is
general, obtains across contexts, and is broadly
generalizable. In other words, generics imply that
a predicate is stable. Interestingly, this ﬁnding
parallels Heyman and Diesendruck’s (2002) result
that Spanish-speaking children with stable views
of traits are more likely to use “ser” (the more
“permanent” form of the verb “to be”). Generics
may not imply other dimensions of essentialism,
such as that a predicate is ﬁxed at birth or genetically
determined.
The ﬁnding that generic production is linked to
conceptual beliefs is consistent with the interpreta-
tion that generics are not just a way of talking, but
instead reﬂect a conceptual attitude (see also
Rhodes et al., 2012). Some people seem to be more
likely to think about the world as consisting of sta-
ble categories, and this way of thinking is reﬂected
in their language use. We speculate that this
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perspective is domain general, such that speakers
who are relatively more essentialist about one
domain are relatively more essentialist about other
domains as well (although the absolute level of
essentialism will vary across domains). Although this
idea has not been directly tested with the domains
of animals, food, and artifacts, prior research does
show that essentialism of different human character-
istics is highly intercorrelated (e.g., someone who is
relatively more essentialist about musical skill is also
relatively more essentialist about shyness; Gelman
et al., 2007). It would be valuable in future research
to examine whether those who view categories as
more stable over time have other aspects of their
personality, attitudes, or cognitive style that might
predict this dimension. For example, adults who
are more essentialist may be more conservative
toward a range of activities and behaviors (Jost,
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Rhodes &
Gelman, 2009), or be more likely to endorse the
idea that environmental regularities are inherent
and stable (Cimpian & Salomon, in press).
A further important point is that parental beliefs
and language relate systematically to children’s lan-
guage. We see this relation in two ways. First, in
both studies, generic language in parents correlates
highly with generic language in children—although
only when parent and child are in conversation
with each other. When parent and child are talking
to researchers, this tight link between their modes
of speaking disappears. This may imply that the
correlation between parent and child generics in the
parent–child conversations reﬂects processes that
are ongoing in the moment, such as nonconscious
conversational alignment strategies, whereby a
speaker implicitly mirrors the speech patterns of the
person they are talking to (Niederhoffer & Penne-
baker, 2002; Pickering & Garrod, 2004). It remains
currently unclear whether the tight link between
parent and child generics during parent–child
conversation is merely a transitory phenomenon, or
whether it may ultimately have longer term impli-
cations for how frequently children focus on generic
kinds. Consistent with the latter possibility, prior
studies have demonstrated important and enduring
relations between parental speech and children’s
own language development (Hart & Risley, 1995;
Hoff, 2006; Huttenlocher, Waterfall, Vasilyeva,
Vevea, & Hedges, 2010; Naigles, 2000). However,
whether these relations hold up at the level of
generic language remains an open issue for future
research.
Second, and perhaps more important, Study 1
found that parents who more ﬁrmly believe that
traits are stable over time have children who more
frequently produce generics. A critically important
question for the future concerns the mechanism by
which child and parent beliefs and generic lan-
guage interrelate (see Segall & Diesendruck, 2013).
Perhaps parents and children hold similar essential-
ist beliefs, which are reﬂected in similar levels of
generic language. Alternatively, parental generic
language may inﬂuence children’s essentialist rea-
soning (see Gunderson et al., 2013, for an example
of how parental praise can affect children’s motiva-
tional frameworks several years later). Other pat-
terns are possible as well (e.g., children may simply
be mimicking the style of language that they hear
from parents). Regardless of whether concepts are
driving language, or language is driving concepts,
the data provide evidence for intergenerational
transmission of parental beliefs.
Although our primary focus was on individual
differences, it is also notable that when examining
the Study 1 data, we obtained an interaction
between speaker (parent, child) and context (par-
ent–child, researcher). Speciﬁcally, in the parent–
child context, parents provided more generics than
children, whereas in the researcher context, children
provided more generics than parents. We hypothe-
size that these patterns are a direct consequence of
the pedagogical status of children and parents in
the two contexts. Pedagogical contexts promote
generic language (Study 2 of this article; Gelman
et al., 2013; see also Csibra & Gergely, 2009). For
example, informational books include substantially
more generics than narrative books, book reading
evokes more generics than toy play, and both chil-
dren and adults produce more generics when
pretending to be a teacher than when pretending
to be a younger child. The ﬁnding that parents
produce more generics than children in the parent–
child context can be predicted from parents’ role as
the more knowledgeable speaker in that context. In
contrast, the ﬁnding that children produce more
generics than parents in the researcher context of
Study 1 may reﬂect that the children’s task was
pedagogical in nature (teaching an ignorant puppet
about the items in the book), whereas the parents’
was nonpedagogical (chatting with the adult
researcher).
It is also striking that children produced so many
generics, in some cases far exceeding their parents.
This result suggests that young children may be
especially focused on kinds, as other researchers
have suggested in the domain of gender (Trautner
et al., 2005). It would be interesting, in future
research, to attempt to control for pedagogical
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status and assess the frequency of generic talk over
development, from early childhood through to
adulthood. In the early preschool years, children
often express generics that seem gratuitous:
“Adams don’t have to take naps!” (said by a 2.5-
year-old named Adam); “Houses don’t have legs”
(said by a 3-year-old). Perhaps preschoolers are
more likely to see the world in terms of categories,
and their language reﬂects this perspective. This
possibility would be consistent with work ﬁnding
relations between early category knowledge and
language skills (Beckage, Smith, & Hills, 2011;
Borovsky & Elman, 2006; Sims & Colunga, 2010). In
any case, the interplay of individual and develop-
mental factors in generic language production is a
rich source of information regarding conceptual
development.
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Appendix
Wording of Questionnaire in Study 1, Using
“Shy” as Sample Characteristic
Birth versus adoptive parents—Will a baby who
is adopted at birth grow up to be as shy as the
birth parents, or as shy as the adoptive parents?
(1 = adoptive parents, 6 = birth parents).
Born—Are some people born with a predisposi-
tion to be shy? (1 = deﬁnitely no, 6 = deﬁnitely yes)
Change—To what extent can people change
whether they are shy, if they want to? (1 = not at
all, 6 = a lot)
Consistent—Do people who are shy at age 20
tend to be shy at age 40? (1 = deﬁnitely no, 6 = deﬁ-
nitely yes)
Environment—How much does the environment
a person grows up in, affect whether or not he or
she will become shy? (1 = not at all, 6 = a lot)
Genes—In the future, will scientists be able to
determine which people are shy by testing their
genes? (1 = deﬁnitely no, 6 = deﬁnitely yes)
Infancy—Do you think scientists will ever be
able to tell which babies will grow up to be shy?
(1 = deﬁnitely no, 6 = deﬁnitely yes)
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